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Management in Workers' 
Compensation Systems
interest in performance measurement 
and performance management has 
expanded remarkably in the past 25 
years. This interest has spawned many 
initiatives, both private and public. One 
of the most ubiquitous has been the 
"balanced scorecard," which developed 
out of the work of two professors at' 
the Harvard Business School in the 
early 1990s, Robert Kaplan and David
The "balanced scorecard" 
was based on the fundamental
concept that since there
are multiple organizational
objectives, there should also
be multiple dimensions of
performance measurement.
Norton. It was based on the fundamental 
concept that since there are (or should 
be) multiple organizational objectives, 
there should also be multiple dimensions 
of performance measurement (Kaplan 
and Norton 1992). Kaplan and Norton 
urged that the financial perspective be 
complemented by a customer perspective, 
an internal process perspective, and 
an organizational learning and growth 
perspective. Only then could performance 
measurement fully serve the strategic 
objectives of the modern enterprise
(see Kaplan and Norton 2001).
While the balanced scorecard was 
finding application in private business, 
nonprofits, and local government entities, 
the federal government was conducting 
a national performance review under 
the leadership of Vice President Al Gore 
(1993). This gave a boost to legislation 
enacted under the title of the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993, 
or GPRA. GPRA is the latest in a series 
of government attempts at "performance 
management," including the Planning- 
Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) 
of 1965, Management by Objectives of 
1973, and Zero-Base Budgeting of 1977 
(see U.S. Government Accounting Office 
[USGAO]1997).
However, GPRA differs from those 
earlier federal efforts in that it also 
imposes a planning and evaluation 
process designed to measure program 
effectiveness and influence budgeting 
decisions. Five-year strategic plans are 
required from all federal agencies (with 
revision every three years), together 
with an annual performance plan that 
has credible outcome-based goals. 
In addition, these "good intentions" 
are being monitored by the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) 
Program Assessment Rating Tool 
(PART), which is being applied across 
all federal government agencies and
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programs on a five-year cycle. In fact, 
the Office of Management and Budget 
conducted PART evaluations on 234 
federal programs during fiscal year 2002- 
2003 and planned to complete 400 by the 
end of fiscal year 2004.
PART rates programs as "effective, 
moderately effective, adequate, results 
not demonstrated, or ineffective" based 
on four criteria. Twenty percent of the 
evaluation is based on management, 20 
percent on program purpose and design, 
10 percent on planning, and 50 percent 
on program results (USGAO 2004). 
While it is too early to judge the ultimate 
success of PART or GPRA, they certainly 
demonstrate growing interest in program 
effectiveness and program evaluation in 
the federal government and elsewhere 
(see USGAO 2004 for a critical view). 
No less an authority than Richard P.
While it is too early to
judge the ultimate success
of PART or GPRA, they
demonstrate growing interest




Nathan, in his recent presidential address 
to the Association for Public Policy 
Analysis and Management, suggested 
"Let's not part with PART" as an 
appropriate slogan for the 2004 election
season.
"State of the Art" Performance 
Measurement in Workers' 
Compensation Systems
Workers' compensation systems 
have not been perceived as among the 
leaders in developing performance 
measurement tools. There are, however, 
a number of impressive performance 
measurement systems currently in place 
throughout the workers' compensation 
world. These performance measurement 
systems are specifically designed to 
support the management of the workers' 
compensation function. They include 
targets or goals, with an accountability
standard that defines acceptable levels of 
performance. For example, examine the 
International Association of Industrial 
Accident Boards and Commission 
Information Product Award winner for 
2003 in the "program improvement 
category."
Nova Scotia Workers' Compensation 
Board (WCB)
The Nova Scotia WCB Performance 
Measurement and Management System 
(PMMS) emphasizes empowering 
WCB employees by giving them the 
necessary information to align their 
personal work goals with organizational 
objectives. This is illustrated in Figure 
1, which shows the conceptual model 
underlying the PMMS. It indicates that 
the goals of the organization are defined 
from the top down, but performance 
accumulates from the bottom up, as 
individual performances add up to team 
performance, which, in turn, sums to unit 
and then department performance. All 
departments taken together constitute 
corporate outcomes.
The PMMS system uses specific
performance bands to define expected 
performance norms based on past 
experience. These "dashboard indicators" 
define adequate (green), marginal 
(yellow), and unacceptable (red) 
performance for each performance 
measure and at each organizational level. 
In this way, individuals or teams with 
performance problems can be identified 
and targeted for additional training or 
assistance.
The primary PMMS performance 
indicators are
  timeliness,
  return-to-work outcomes,
  claim durations,
  claim costs,
  staff availability, and
  stakeholder satisfaction.
The system is a proprietary, Web- 
based application designed to assign each 
user the necessary level of access, as 
well as the appropriate performance level 
indicators. Thus, individual caseworkers 
may access their own monthly 
performance results, as well as their 
team, unit, and department performance 
results, but they cannot access another







SOURCE: Nova Scotia WCB.
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individual's results. Similarly, team 
managers have access to results for their 
departments, units, and teams, plus the 
individuals in the team, but not for other 
teams or individuals. There are seven 
distinct levels of security access built into 
this system.
For each performance area, the 
software permits "drill-thru" to more 
refined or specific measures. For 
example, the corporate timeliness of 
payment measure allows drill-thru to the 
five different client service units, which 
are organized geographically. Data (and 
dashboard indicators) are displayed 
for the current month and the previous 
month, as well as the threshold levels for 
green, yellow, and red indicators. Human 
contact for more information is also 
listed. Individual worker-level data are 
displayed for the last eight measurement 
periods (typically months). This permits
Lost production days is the
ultimate performance measure
for a workers' compensation
agency, because it represents
both the incidence of claims and
their severity or duration.
easy identification of performance 
trends and enables quick intervention for 
remedial efforts or workload rebalancing.
The PMMS system also produces 
management information reports 
that support day-to-day operational 
management. For instance, there is a 
"Medium High Caseload Report," which 
identifies units, teams, or individuals 
with relatively high caseloads. The report 
assigns each claim a status and weight 
based on specific activities happening 
with the claim. The system is designed to 
represent the amount of effort that would 
typically be required for a case of that 
status. Management can then work with 
this list to maintain more equitable file 
distribution and resultant work burden.
The WCB of Nova Scotia reports 
that employee users indicate that the 
software tool is "intuitive and relevant 
to their work." Eighty-five percent of 
staff surveyed in 2002 indicated that they 
understood their personal performance
targets. The board of directors has also 
expressed a high level of satisfaction with 
the information they receive monthly 
from PMMS. The bottom line is that 
timeliness to first payment improved 
from 60.5 percent in May 2002 to 81.5 
percent in May 2003.
Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, U.S. Department of Labor
The Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs (OWCP) in the U.S. 
Department of Labor has developed 
what may be the best single outcome 
measure for a workers' compensation 
agency. Lost production days is the 
ultimate performance measure for a 
workers' compensation agency because 
it simultaneously represents both the 
incidence of claims and their severity or 
duration. A reduction in lost production 
days is clearly a good thing for both 
workers and their agencies. In response 
to the pressures generated by GPRA, 
OWCP decided to measure production 
days lost due to workers' compensation 
claims in the federal employing agencies, 
and to evaluate OWCP performance in 
terms of reducing average lost production 
days.2
This system was originally 
implemented as a way to track
performance under the Quality Case 
Management program, a nurse-based 
case management system designed to 
return long-term Federal Employees 
Compensation Act (FECA) claimants to 
employment. Using this measurement to 
manage performance over time appears 
to have been very effective as the average 
duration reduction has been nearly 20 
percent over an eight-year period. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the lost 
production days measure was extended 
to the entire FECA program in fiscal year 
2001. It has subsequently been adopted 
under the President's Safety, Health and 
Return-to-Employment initiative for 
all federal employees for 2004-2006. 
OWCP reports results on this and other 
performance measures by individual 
agency on their Web site (http://www.dol- 
esa.gov/share/).
Conclusions
Performance measurement has clearly 
gained a (tenuous) foothold within some 
workers' compensation systems in North 
America. One gets the impression that 
the "state of the art" is better in Canada 
than in the United States. But perhaps 
that impression results from the more 
competitive workers' compensation 
environment in the United States, which
Figure 2 Average Lost Production Days in Quality Case Management Program by 
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leads insurers to think of performance 
measurement systems as a part of their 
competitive advantage.
On the other hand, there are also 
limits to the role of performance 
measurement in workers' compensation 
systems. First must come the dictum 
that "what gets measured gets done." 
However, the obverse question is, What 
is not measured? It seems clear that 
concentration on achieving one goal in 
complex social systems like these will 
likely come at the expense of alternative 
goals. It may not be evident immediately, 
but the time and energy that go into 
achieving the stated goal will be diverted 
from some other activity with an unstated 
or unmeasured goal. This may or may 
not be a problem, but the issue should 
be carefully examined to make sure that 
the net result is not a surprise (see Meyer 
2002).
The other question is, What happens 
when things go bad? The savvy executive 
knows that is the time to change the 
performance measurement system! On 
the other hand, corporate and public 
governance systems must develop 
the capability to deal with this issue. 
Performance goals should be potentially 
achievable, or they will not motivate 
better performance. But this means 
goals must reflect the underlying reality, 
and that reality may change rapidly. So 
performance goals must also be flexible.
Finally, observers ask if performance 
measurement is just "the flavor of the 
month." This seems unlikely, since 
it is part of a much broader trend in 
government, education, and private 
enterprise. But ultimately performance 
measurement must be adopted by 
stakeholders as an important part of 
system management if it is to truly 
reach its ultimate potential. It is still 
very early in the history of performance 
measurement in workers' compensation; 
it remains to be seen how much effective 
performance management it will lead to. 
Researchers and policy analysts look 
forward to watching this process unfold 
over the next several years.
H. Allan Hunt is assistant executive director at the 
Upjohn Institute.
Notes
1. See Nathan's remarks at http://www.appam 
.org/conferences/fall/atlanta2004/APPAM_ 
Presidential_Speech_04.pdf.
2. It should be noted that OWCP maintains a 
number of other performance measures that are 
not covered here. See U.S. Department of Labor 
(2004a) for details.
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Hoyt N. Wheeler, Brian S. Klaas, and Douglas M. Mahony
Workplace Justice 
Without Unions
NOTE: This article draws upon research from the 
authors' book, Workplace Justice Without Unions, 
which was published last year by the W.E. Upjohn 
Institute for Employment Research. See http://www 
.upjohninstitute.org/or information on how to order 
the book.
"W,
here there is no rule of law 
but only the command of persons, where 
secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one 
never knows when or why the axe will 
fall, there justice weeps" (Wolterstorff 
2001).
Human dignity at the workplace 
requires the right to just treatment by 
those holding authority. At the crux of 
this is protection from arbitrary action  
action that is based upon personality 
rather than merit, and is not predictable 
on any reasoned basis. When a human 
being is treated as merely a means 
to an end, a thing to be employed by 
others, rather than as a person deserving 
justice, justice does indeed weep. This 
is especially true where a person's job is 
at stake. In our society, an individual's 
job is not only the source of economic 
goods, but also an important part of 
how we define ourselves and others 
define us and our role in society. Where 
workers can be terminated from their 
employment for any reason, or none 
at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is 
historically the basic principle of the law 
of employment termination in the United 
States.
Corporations are social organizations 
arranged in a hierarchy in which those 
at the top exercise authority over those 
at the bottom. This inevitably means 
that control must be exerted over those 
who are employed by others. In such 
circumstances, both human nature 
and differing interests between the 
employed and the employer give rise to 
a situation in which an abuse of power 
is not only possible, but highly likely. 
In the workplace there are order givers
and order takers. One instrument of 
control by order givers is the threat 
of termination of the relationship. 
Ultimately, employees who do not behave 
as they are ordered will be separated from 
the organization fired.
Fortunately, since the days when 
the employment-at-will principle was 
adopted by American courts in the late 
nineteenth century, there has been a 
considerable erosion of it. What has 
occurred over a period of about 90 
years is the construction of a patchwork 
of limitations on employment-at- 
will. Yet, the employer's power is 
still quite substantial. Arguably, it has 
grown significantly by virtue of some 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
approving employer-mandated arbitration 
(employment arbitration).
The Practice of Workplace Justice
A major development in the area of 
workplace justice has been the adoption 
of organizational justice procedures by 
nonunion employers. The more advanced 
forms of these procedures have come 
along relatively recently. Based on 
data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred 
Foulkes (1980) found that by far the most 
common employer device for handling 
employee grievances at that time was 
the open-door policy, which is a very 
rudimentary workplace justice procedure. 
More advanced forms of nonbinding 
policies have included 1) installing 
an ombudsman, a corporate employee 
who independently deals with worker 
problems; and 2) mediation, where a 
neutral third party works to facilitate a 
resolution of the dispute.
An especially interesting 
organizational justice procedure 
originated in the 1980s peer review 
panels. Here, a panel of employees (and 
sometimes managers) makes a final 
decision or recommendation regarding an
employee's grievance.
The management-initiated 
organizational justice system to 
most recently rise to prominence is 
employment arbitration. In employment 
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires 
employees to agree to submit any 
complaints (or sometimes any allegations 
of violation of law on the part of the 
employer) to a neutral arbitrator who 
will render a final and binding decision 
on the matter. This is by far the most 
controversial of these systems. The 
fairness of employment arbitration has 
been vigorously attacked on the grounds 
that it deprives employees of their legal 
right to go to court, and to a jury trial, 
and substitutes an employer-mandated 
system that is set up and controlled by the 
employer.
Design of the Study
There is a substantial literature on 
workplace justice; much of it relates 
to employment arbitration. However, 
a systematic analysis of this literature, 
while useful, fails to produce any solid 
conclusions with respect to the main 
questions of interest. To remedy this, 
we have gathered an extensive body of 
new data in an attempt to move toward 
clearer answers to the issues inherent 
in these systems. The empirical portion 
of our study has several aspects. First, 
in order to judge the substantive results 
obtained under these various procedures, 
we analyze overall win/loss rates by 
employees in a sample of termination 
cases in labor arbitration and employment 
arbitration and in a sample of cases from 
federal courts.
Our second and most intensive 
research strategy is our attempt to 
determine the degree to which the same 
result would be reached in the same cases 
across different types of decision makers. 
This is tested by posing hypothetical 
scenarios to labor arbitrators, 
employment arbitrators, managers, 
members of peer review panels, jurors in 
employment discrimination cases, and 
labor court judges from other countries. 
By analyzing the responses to these 
scenarios, we can compare the harshness 
or leniency of the systems toward
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employees for different disciplinary 
offenses, and the criteria used to reach 
decisions.
Results
Existing studies that evaluate 
workplace justice systems by looking 
at the win/loss rates by employees and 
employers show that the results are 
mixed. Probably the most striking result 
is the low percentage of employee wins 
in discrimination cases in federal courts. 
When we analyzed data on win/loss 
rates from our own sample of arbitration 
awards and recent reports of federal court 
decisions, we obtained the results set out 
in Table 1.
Although comparing the overall 
win rate of employees in employment 
arbitration with those in the other 
two procedural alternatives is of 
some interest, the most meaningful 
comparisons are between results in 
particular categories of employment 
arbitration cases and other systems. Our 
most pertinent comparison is of court 
cases involving claims of discrimination 
in violation of a federal statute and 
employment arbitration cases involving 
that same claim.
In employment arbitration cases 
where a federal discrimination statute 
was involved, employees won 22 percent 
of the cases. This compares to only 12 
percent in federal district courts in the 
most recent five-year period. Thus, the 
chances of an employee winning would 
appear to be much greater in employment 
arbitration than in court when the case 
goes to a final adjudication. However, 
this does not take settlements into 
account.
In labor arbitration cases under a 
collective bargaining contract, unlike 
court cases enforcing a federal statute, 
the employer has the burden of proving 
misconduct and the propriety of the 
penalty. Usually the standard is proof 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
However, more serious cases may require 
proof by clear and convincing evidence, 
or even proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The principal limitation on the kind 
of analysis described so far is that it 
does not hold constant the nature of the 
cases decided upon in the various justice
Table 1 Employee/Employer Win Rates
Procedure Percent employee wins Percent employer wins
Employment arbitration" 
Overall
n = 2l6 ' " '

























"SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994-2002; American Arbitration
Association, Employment Dispute Arbitration Reports, 1999-2000. 
b SOURCE: Bureau of National Affairs, Labor Arbitration Reports, 1994-2002. 
c SOURCE: Federal District-Court Civil Cases, 2001. See http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090.
systems. It is to this limitation that the 
most intensive portion of our research 
addresses itself. This stage of our study 
consists of developing hypothetical cases 
on termination of employment and asking 
different types of decision makers to 
indicate whether they would find in favor 
of the employer or the employee if they 
were deciding the case. We attempted not 
only to discover tendencies to decide in 
favor of either employees or employers, 
but also to determine what were the 
important factors that influence different 
decision makers. The decision makers 
to whom these hypothetical cases were 
posed included employment arbitrators, 
labor arbitrators, peer review panelists, 
human resources officers, persons who 
had served as jurors in discrimination 
cases, and labor court judges from several 
countries.
The results of our work on 
hypothetical cases are complex. One 
relatively simple set of findings that 
provides something of an overall view of 
the results indicates that, in response to 
our hypothetical cases, the percentage of 
cases decided in favor of employees was 
greatest by labor arbitrators (55 percent) 
and labor court judges (51 percent); 
lowest for employment arbitrators, 
both when they were deciding statutory 
claims (25 percent) and when they were
applying a "for cause" requirement in 
a contract of employment (33 percent); 
and in between these extremes for HR 
managers (46 percent), peer review 
panelists (45 percent), and jurors (38 
percent). So, holding constant the 
particular cases decided produces results 
that are quite different from the results of 
looking at overall win/loss rates as we do 
in Table 1. These bare results, although 
useful, should be viewed with some 
caution, and should be understood in the 
context of the complete body of results 
and analysis.
Professors Hoyt Wheeler, Brian Klaas, and Douglas 
Mahony are faculty members at the Moore School 
of Business, University of South Carolina.
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This volume reveals how, as a result 
of policy reforms at the national, state, 
and local levels, programming by 
different institutions and innovative 
professional 
practices converged 








to substantially revamp their operations 
by promoting the principles of 
universal access, integration of federal 
funding streams, devolution of policy 
to local authorities, and work-first as a 
starting point for employment services. 
As a result, many new programs were 
started by nontraditional institutions, 
traditional programs underwent rapid 
transformations, and some providers 
exited the industry.
The studies presented here constitute 
a first step toward a comprehensive 
assessment of the role that community 
organizations played in revamping the 
employment services industry. Most 
importantly, they show how a new 
style of labor market intermediary 
has evolved from focusing almost 
exclusively on the provision of 
employment services to job seekers to 
simultaneously addressing the needs of 
both job seekers and employers.
499 pp. $70 cloth ISBN 0-88099-317-0 
$25 paper ISBN 0-88099-316-2 / 2004.
David E. Balducchi,
Randall W. Eberts, and
Christopher J. O'Leary, Editors
This book describes the evolution 
of labor exchange policy in the United 
States and summarizes the major findings 
about the effectiveness of labor exchange 
services. The book's contributors address 
key issues concerning public labor 
exchange, including 1) the evolution of 
federal-state relations in labor exchange 
policy resulting 
from the Workforce 
Investment Act 
of 1998; 2) trends 
affecting the delivery 
of labor exchange 
services by state 
agencies, particularly 
how they interact 
with other public 
programs; 3) the performance and 
accountability mechanisms under which 
employment service offices operate 
and the effectiveness of employment 
services in helping job seekers find jobs; 
4) the growing number and assortment 
of Internet-based tools and information 
sources that help people find jobs; 5) 
the international perspective on job 
brokerage functions; and 6) the current 
and future role of labor exchange 
services.
In addition, the book examines the 
appropriate role for government in 
helping job seekers and employers make 
the proper job match and provides an 
overview of U.S. labor exchange policy 
as it existed during the last three decades 
of the twentieth century.
295 pp. $45 cloth ISBN 0-88099-303-0 
$20 paper ISBN 0-88099-302-2 / 2004.
Job Training Policy 
in the United States
Christopher J. O'Leary,
Robert A. Straits, and
Stephen A. Wandner, Editors
The U.S. Department of Labor 
began funding job training programs 
some 40 years ago. The first of 
these programs was the Manpower 
Development and Training Act 
(MDTA) in 1962, which was
followed by the 
Comprehensive 
Employment 
and Training Act 
(CETA) in 1973, 
the Job Training
 \ Partnership Act 
(JTPA) in 1982, 
and the Workforce 
Investment Act 
(WIA) in 1998. As one program 
supplanted another, job training 
evolved from having strong federal 
control to substantial local authority, 
from narrowly targeted services 
to broadly available services, and 
from proscribed training options to 
significant customer choices.
This volume provides a broad 
overview of federally funded job 
training programs as they exist today. 
The notable contributors review what 
training consists of and how training 
programs are implemented under WIA. 
In particular, they examine training 
service providers and methods of 
delivering training services, including 
the use of individual training accounts 
and eligible training provider lists. 
Performance management under 
WIA is examined, as well as the 
effectiveness of training programs. In 
addition, public training programs are 
compared to private training provided 
in the United States and to public 
training programs offered in other 
industrial nations.
332 pp. $50 cloth ISBN 0-88099-307-3 
$22 paper ISBN 0-88099-306-5 / 2004.
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